The Japanese market for corporate control and managerial incentives by Yamada, Takeshi & Kang, Jun-Koo
The Japanese Market for Corporate 
Control and Managerial Incentives 
Jun-Koo Kang & Takeshi Yamada 
Working Paper No. 107 
Jun-Koo Kang 
A. Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management 
University of California 
Riverside, CA 
Takeshi Yamada 
School of Business and Management 
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology 
Kowloon, Hong Kong 
This paper was presented at the conference Emerging Trends in Japanese Financial Markets 
held at Columbia University on December 8-9, 1995. The conference was sponsored by the 
Center on Japanese Economy and Business and organized by Professor Yasushi Hamao 
Working Paper Series 
Center on Japanese Economy and Business 
Graduate School of Business 
Columbia University 
February 1996 
The Japanese market for corporate control and managerial incentives 
Jun-Koo Kang* 
A. Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management 
University of California 





School of Business and Management 
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology 





We examine bidder returns in Japanese mergers from 1976 to 1990. Using a comprehensive 
sample of 104 Japanese acquiring firms, we find that shareholders of Japanese bidders 
experience a significant positive abnormal return of 1.41%. Bidder returns are higher when firms 
acquire targets in the same industry, when their managers performed well before the merger, and 
when their managers acquire relatively large targets. We also find that bidder returns increase 
with the bidder's leverage and the bidder's ties to financial institutions through borrowings. Our 
evidence is consistent with the view that managerial incentives affect a firm's investment 
decisions and therefore firm value, and that these incentives are affected by the internal 
governance mechanisms that control managerial discretion. 
* We are grateful for comments from Warren Bailey, Y. Peter Chung, Chung Gee, Takeo Hoshi, 
Hasung Jang, Herb Johnson, Andrew Karolyi, Kenneth Kim, Phill Sang Lee, Frank Lichtenberg, 
David Mayers, Sang-Koo Nam, Henry Oppenheimer, Anil Shivdasani, Yong-sup Yun, 
participants at the Emerging Trends in Japanese Financial Markets Conference at the Columbia 
University and at a seminar at the Korea University, and for useful conversations with Kenneth 
Singleton. Please address correspondence to Jun-Koo Kang. 
The Japanese market for corporate control and managerial incentives 
Abstract 
We examine bidder returns in Japanese mergers from 1976 to 1990. Using a comprehensive 
sample of 104 Japanese acquiring firms, we find that shareholders of Japanese bidders 
experience a significant positive abnormal return of 1.41%. Bidder returns are higher when firms 
acquire targets in the same industry, when their managers performed well before the merger, and 
when their managers acquire relatively large targets. We also find that bidder returns increase 
with the bidder's leverage and the bidder's ties to financial institutions through borrowings. Our 
evidence is consistent with the view that managerial incentives affect a firm's investment 
decisions and therefore firm value, and that these incentives are affected by the internal 
governance mechanisms that control managerial discretion. 
The Japanese market for corporate control and managerial incentives 
There has been much debate on whether the actions of Japanese corporate governance 
mechanisms are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization.1 Several researchers argue that 
while the corporate governance mechanisms in Japan are fundamentally different from those in the 
U.S., alternative governance systems in Japan provide managers incentives to maximize firm 
value. For instance, Aoki (1990) and Sheard (1989) argue that Japanese banks, which are allowed 
to hold a firm's equity, perform an important governance role and discipline managers when their 
performance is poor. In contrast to this view, others argue that the absence of hostile acquisitions, 
the absence of outside directors, and the crossholdings among many Japanese firms insulate 
Japanese managers from outside influence and thus leave them unconstrained. 
In spite of considerable controversy over the importance of corporate governance 
mechanisms in Japan and their effects on managerial incentives and firm value, there is little 
empirical evidence on the links between them. Using a comprehensive sample of 104 Japanese 
mergers during the 15 year period from 1976 to 1990, this paper examines the effects of bidding 
managers' incentives and corporate control mechanisms on bidding firm value. Managerial 
objectives and corporate governance mechanisms are likely to play an important role when 
managers consider acquiring other firms, because corporate control transactions usually involve 
major organizational changes that have direct effects on firm value. Therefore, one approach to 
investigating whether Japanese managers have different objectives from their American 
counterparts and whether the effects of actions by corporate governance mechanisms on firm value 
are different between the U.S. and Japan is to study the cross-sectional variation of bidder 
announcement returns, focusing on factors that can influence managerial incentives. Furthermore, 
1
 For a discussion of the Japanese governance mechanism, see Aoki (1984, 1990), Nakatani (1984), Kester (1986, 
1990), Ballon and Tomita (1988), Sheard (1989), Prowse (1990), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), and 
Kaplan (1994). 
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the stock-price reaction to the initial public announcement of domestic mergers for Japanese 
acquiring firms has not been empirically examined by the previous studies.2 
Considerable evidence in the U.S. suggests that bidder returns in mergers and acquisitions 
are either affected by bidding managers' incentives or related to internal governance systems which 
serve as mechanisms to control managerial discretion. For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1990) show that for a sample of 326 U.S. mergers between 1975 and 1987, bidder returns are 
significantly affected by management's objective function: Returns to bidders are lower when they 
acquire targets operating in different industries and when their managers performed poorly before 
the merger. In a similar context, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) find that the largest total 
takeover gain occurs when bidders with high Tobin's Q acquire targets with low Tobin's Q. In 
related papers, Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) find that bidder returns are positively 
related to the bidder's managerial equity ownership; Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) 
find that bidder returns increase with their leverage levels; and Byrd and Hickman (1992) show 
that bidder returns are less negative for firms on whose boards at least half the seats are held by 
independent outside directors. These results are generally consistent with the view that managerial 
incentives affect a firm's investment decisions and therefore firm value, and that these incentives, 
in turn, are affected by bidder-specific characteristics which serve as incentive control mechanisms. 
To examine whether firm value is related to managerial incentives in Japanese firm 
takeovers, we first classify our sample of 104 bidders into subsamples of interest based on bidding 
managers' motives for mergers. If certain types of mergers are driven by bidding managers' 
incentives to maximize their private benefits, we expect that those mergers systematically lead to 
lower returns to shareholders of acquiring firms. To measure the potential difference in managerial 
incentives in mergers, we follow Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and compare returns to 
bidders that acquire targets in the same industry to those in a different industry. As argued by 
Amihud and Lev (1981), managers who have incentives to lower the variability of their personal 
2
 See Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) for evidence on the announcement returns for 
acquiring firms in the U.S. 
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wealth may undertake value-reducing acquisitions. Managers who want to reduce the risk to their 
human capital may choose to engage in conglomerate mergers, even though these activities can 
adversely affect shareholder wealth. The view that unrelated diversification decreases firm value is 
supported by several empirical studies. Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and 
Comment and Jarrell (1995) provide evidence that diversification represents a suboptimal 
managerial strategy resulting in a value loss. 
Using industrial relationships between bidders and targets, we then extend our analysis to 
examine whether managers of keiretsu firms face different incentives from those facing managers 
of U.S. or non-keiretsu firms. One important feature of Japanese financial characteristics is that 
many Japanese firms belong to industrial groups known as keiretsu, where each group's bank 
plays a leading role in the financial activities within the group. Firms belonging to a keiretsu are 
bound together by a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, and maintain substantial business ties 
with other firms in the group.3 As argued in Kang and Stulz (1996), managers in keiretsu firms 
are more likely to focus on the wealth of their long-term investors, who are mostly other keiretsu 
members. Since these keiretsu firms often buy and sell goods and services from one another 
[Berglof and Perotti (1994)] and they are connected by an extensive arrangement of reciprocal 
shareholding agreements, the typical manager in a keiretsu firm may face incentives quite different 
from those of the typical U.S. manager. In this context, Kester (1991) argues that Japanese 
managers in keiretsu firms have a strong incentive to maximize the overall value of many different 
stakeholders, including other keiretsu member firms.4 If managers of keiretsu firms are more 
concerned about other keiretsu members and consequently acquire targets operating in different 
industries to maximize the aggregate value among keiretsu firms, then unrelated diversification 
3
 Currently, there are 6 major industrial groups in Japan (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, and Sanwa), 
which form the core of Japan's premier keiretsu. These groups are characterized by horizontal connections over a 
wide spectrum of industries, such as mining, construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and financial and 
insurance. 
4
 See also Kester (1990) and Porter (1992) for an extensive discussion of the difference in managerial objectives faced 
by Japanese managers. Kang and Stulz (1996) argue that Japanese managers issue shares based on different 
considerations than American managers, and show that Japanese managers are more interested in maximizing the 
wealth of long-term shareholders rather than that of short-term shareholders. 
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pursued by managers of keiretsu firms may not necessarily represent managerial self-interest, and 
thus will have a different effect on firm value compared to unrelated diversification pursued by 
managers of non-keiretsu firms. 
We also compare returns to bidders whose previous stock returns before the merger were 
above their industry averages to returns to bidders whose previous stock returns were below their 
industry averages. This classification is based on the possibility that managers who performed 
poorly before the merger are more likely to make bad acquisitions because of their lack of 
managerial ability. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) develop a model where a manager who wants to 
keep his job has an incentive to make irreversible investments of corporate wealth in assets that are 
complementary to his own skills and abilities. They argue that to reduce the threat of replacement, 
managers who underperform their industry peers have more incentive to overpay for their 
acquisitions or to enter new businesses they might be good at. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) also 
argue that value-reducing diversification is more likely in firms that are underperforming their 
industry peers. 
It is widely argued that there exist important systems in Japan that serve as mechanisms for 
internal and external governance, and that these mechanisms play an important role in mitigating 
the manager-shareholder conflict. A key aspect of Japanese corporate governance mechanisms is 
that some firms maintain close financial ties with commercial banks and receive substantial debt 
and/or equity financing from them. As Jensen (1986) argues, the fixed-payment pattern of this 
large debt can create an incentive for managers to overcome their inefficiencies. Furthermore, 
Fama (1990) argues that loans allow the monitoring of the conflict between debtholders and 
shareholders to be largely delegated to banks and provide mechanisms for monitoring this conflict. 
In addition to corporate lending, Japanese banks are allowed to own up to 5 percent of a 
firm's equity. In general, Japanese banks hold a substantial portion of voting rights in many 
firms. In 1990, Japanese financial institutions, including banks and insurance companies, held 
46.0% of the shares listed on all the eight stock exchanges in Japan [Tokyo Stock Exchange Fact 
Book, 1993]. Since large shareholders tend to receive more benefits from monitoring, Japanese 
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financial institutions as large shareholders are expected to undertake an important monitoring role 
in reducing managerial inefficiencies [Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Jensen (1989)].5 To see the 
role of Japanese governance systems in the market for corporate control, we examine the effect of 
bidding firms' capital and ownership structure on the stock-price reaction to the announcement of 
mergers. 
Our evidence suggests that Japanese mergers are, on average, value-increasing events for 
shareholders of acquiring firms. We find that shareholders of acquiring firms realize a positive 
two-day announcement return of 1.41%, which is significant at the 0.01 level. Consistent with the 
findings of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), we find that bidder returns are higher when the 
bidders acquire firms operating in the same industry, or when the bidders performed well prior to 
the merger. We also find that bidder returns are most striking when bidders with strong past stock 
return performances acquire targets in the same industries. For this type of merger, bidder returns 
are 3.50% on average and significantly higher than for any other types of mergers. In contrast, 
bidders with bad performance that acquire targets in different industries realize the smallest return 
-- an insignificant average return of 0.02%. Thus, our evidence suggests that firm value is affected 
by managerial discretion in making acquisitions. We also find that unlike non-keiretsu firms, 
returns to keiretsu firms are higher when they acquire firms operating in different industries, 
supporting the view that the stock market differentiates unrelated acquisitions by keiretsu firm from 
those by non-keiretsu firms. 
We also find that Japanese corporate control mechanisms perform an important role in 
monitoring managers. We find a positive and significant relation between leverage and abnormal 
returns to acquiring firms. This positive relation is more pronounced when the level of loans the 
bidder utilized from financial institutions is used in place of total debt to measure the leverage ratio, 
suggesting that the control function of debt in Japan comes mainly from loans. These findings are 
consistent with Jensen's (1986) claim that debt controls managerial discretion. The evidence also 
5 Japanese corporate investors also hold extensive equity in other corporations. In 1990, equity ownership held by 
corporate shareholders was, on average, 24.8% of the shares listed on all the eight stock exchanges in Japan. 
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lends support to Fama's (1990) argument by implying that loans reduce the agency costs of debt 
and induce managers to follow a value-maximizing policy. 
Overall, our results provide evidence that in mergers where the manager's private benefits 
are likely to be smallest or in mergers where the influence of internal corporate governance is likely 
to be greatest, there is a statistically and economically significant increase in firm value. In 
contrast, other types of mergers do not display any evidence of an increase in firm value. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section I, we review the related 
literature. Section II describes the data. In section III, we provide abnormal returns for various 
subsamples of interest and report results from cross-sectional regressions. A summary and 
concluding remarks are presented in section IV. 
I. A review of the literature 
Our paper is closely related to work by Pettway and Yamada (1986), who examine bidder 
and target returns in Japanese mergers. Pettway and Yamada (1986) show that for their sample of 
50 Japanese bidders during the period 1977-1984, bidder returns are significantly positive around 
merger announcements. However, their study uses the board-meeting date, which is usually the 
resolution date, as the announcement date. Consequently, their evidence is not directly comparable 
to American evidence, which uses the first public announcement date. We find several cases, in 
fact, where the first public announcement dates from Japanese daily newspapers are substantially 
ahead of the board-meeting dates, sometimes by as much as three years. Furthermore, their study 
does not examine issues related to the cross-sectional variation in bidder returns. 
In related work, Kang (1993), using announcements in the Wall Street Journal, finds that 
Japanese bidders acquiring U.S. firms experience a significant positive 2-day announcement 
abnormal return of 0.59%. Using a sample of 119 Japanese bidding firms from 1975 to 1988, he 
shows that bidder-specific characteristics are useful in explaining the cross-sectional variation in 
bidder returns: Returns to Japanese bidders increase with the bidder's leverage and the bidder's ties 
to financial institutions through borrowings. He interprets these results as evidence that debt 
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controls managerial discretion and performs an important monitoring role. While his study has the 
advantage of using the announcement date identified from the Wall Street Journal, it focuses only 
on cross-border acquisitions, where Japanese bidder returns can be affected by several other 
factors, such as the exchange-rate movement, the anticipated U.S. trade restriction, the size of the 
U.S. market, and its political stability. 
Our paper is also related to several other studies that examine the link between the corporate 
control mechanisms in Japan and firm performance.6 Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) 
provide evidence that investment by Japanese firms is affected by their financial structure. They 
find that for firms with a close relationship to a bank, liquidity does not play a role in determining 
investment whereas Tobin's Q has a major role, and for firms that do not maintain such a 
relationship, the opposite results are obtained. Given that bank-affiliated firms can avoid arms-
length capital-market transactions in financing investments, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 
(1991) interpret these results as evidence that bank-affiliated firms can circumvent Jensen and 
Meckling's (1976) incentive problem and Myers and Majluf's (1984) asymmetric information 
problem. Prowse (1990) also finds that a close financial tie with large banks reduces the agency 
costs in a firm's financial structure and thus influences its investment decisions. 
Evidence on the role of ownership structure in Japan is provided by Prowse (1992), 
Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1996). Prowse (1992) shows no 
significant relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profit rate for a sample of 
734 Japanese firms. Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) find that equity ownership by financial 
institutions has a positive effect on corporate performance in Japan while equity ownership by 
other corporations has a negative effect. In comparison, Kang and Shivdasani (1996) show that 
corporate shareholders play an important role during outside succession. Using a sample of 432 
Japanese firms that announce top management turnover during 1985 to 1990, they document that 
the likelihood of an outside appointment increases significantly with the ownership by corporate 
investors. The stock-price reaction, however, is not related to the ownership by corporate 
6
 See Jensen and Warner (1988) for evidence on this issue in the U.S. 
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investors. They also find that outside succession is more likely when the removal of the old 
president is forced, and the stock-price reaction is significantly positive when turnover is forced 
and the successor is appointed from outside the firm. They suggest that the disciplinary decisions 
of Japanese governance mechanisms are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. 
II. Data 
Our sample consists of non-financial Japanese acquiring firms that are listed on either the 
First Section or the Second Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). Initially, we identified a 
sample of acquiring firms from the Shohou (Gazette) published by the TSE, in which the effective 
date of the merger is between March 31, 1977 and December 1, 1990. We then eliminate those 
cases where merging firms owned all the shares of the acquired firm prior to the merger. This 
procedure yields a sample of 132 acquiring firms. For these 132 acquiring firms, we identify the 
initial public announcement date of the merger from four daily newspapers published by Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun-sha: Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Economic Journal) which is the equivalent 
of the Wall Street Journal for Japan, Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun (Industrial Journal), Nikkei Ryutuu 
Shimbun (Distribution Journal), and Nikkei Kinyuu Shimbun (Finance Journal). The date that a 
merger announcement first appears in any one of these four publications is used as the 
announcement date. Finally, we confine our sample to acquiring firms for which stock-price data 
are available on the daily return file from the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) Research 
Center. These restrictions result in a final sample of 104 observations.7 Sixty-four firms financed 
the entire transaction through an exchange of common stock, and forty firms used the combination 
of common stock and cash as the form of payment when they acquired targets. 
7
 In many cases, the acquired firms were not listed on the TSE at the time of merger announcement. We find that 
for the targets of the 104 bidders, only 17 target firms were listed on the TSE, while two target firms were listed on 
the regional stock exchanges, Nagoya and Osaka, with the remaining 85 targets held privately. Kester (1991) also 
shows that most Japanese merger and acquisition activity has been concentrated in the third tier of the market, where 
targets are small and unlisted. Since the PACAP file does not cover delisted firms due to mergers during our sample 
period, we restrict our analysis only to bidders. 
8 
Table I summarizes Japanese merger activity by year and by industry of acquiring firms. 
Years 1989, 1988, and 1985 experience the most merger announcements with 14, 12, and 11 
cases, respectively. A breakdown of mergers by industry shows that most acquiring firms are 
classified as manufacturing (69 cases), wholesale and retail (20 cases), and construction (8 cases). 
Table II shows summary statistics for a sample of 104 Japanese acquiring firms. These 
data are obtained from the PACAP Research Center database, Nikkei database, Analyst's Guide by 
Daiwa Institutes of Research Ltd., Shohou by the TSE, Annual Securities Statistics by the TSE, 
and acquiring firms' annual/semi-annual reports. Panel A reports the merger-specific 
characteristics and the past stock return performance for sample firms. Using the 3-digit SIC 
codes provided by the PACAP, we find that 55% of our sample firms acquired target firms 
operating in the same industry.8 The median (mean) relative book value of target equity to bidder 
equity is 14% (32%) and the median (mean) ratio of the value of transaction to market value of 
bidder equity is 7% (17%), where the value of the transaction is the sum of cash and common 
stock paid to the target. Common stock paid is measured by the number of acquiring firm's shares 
issued to target times the acquiring firm's stock price per share at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding the merger announcement. For the calculation of the value of the transaction, target 
shares held by the bidder are excluded from the number of shares outstanding to avoid double 
counting. Panel A also shows that Japanese acquiring firms hold a relatively large fraction of 
target shares before the merger announcement (median 20% and mean 27%).9 To measure the past 
performance of the acquiring firm, we use the firm's cumulative excess stock return relative to its 
industry. We compute the industry-adjusted cumulative excess stock return from -270 days to -20 
days before the merger announcement using the value-weighted Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) 
8
 We refer to a merger involving two firms engaged in the same industry as a related merger and a merger involving 
two firms engaged in different industries as an unrelated merger. 
9
 The Japanese Ministry of Finance classifies a firm as a "subsidiary" (ko-gaisha) if more than 50 percent of its 
shares are owned by the other firm and classifies a firm as a "related" firm (kanren-gaisha) if more than 20 percent but 
less than 50 percent are owned by the other firm. See Ballon and Tomita (1988). 
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for each industry. The mean and median industry-adjusted returns during the previous one-year 
period are 8.75% and 4.50%, respectively, and they are statistically significant. 
Panel B of table II shows summary statistics of firm-specific and governance characteristics 
for our sample firms. The market value of bidder equity averages ¥173 billion, and the mean book 
value of assets is ¥274 billion. The average price-earnings ratio for Japanese sample firms is 68 
times, which is relatively high compared to U.S. standards [French and Poterba (1991)]. 
Leverage is measured by debt divided by the quasi-market value of the firm (debt plus market value 
of equity) and is, on average, 55%. Loans from financial institutions represent about 44% of this 
leverage ratio. 
Panel B also presents the equity ownership structure of Japanese acquiring firms. Japanese 
financial institutions including banks and insurance companies and other corporations hold, on 
average, 31% and 30% of a firm's equity, respectively, whereas the top ten shareholders and 
managers who are the members of the boards of directors own 46% and 4% of the equity, 
respectively. In panel B, we divide the sample into firms that belong to a keiretsu and those that do 
not. We use the 1985 edition of Industrial Groupings in Japan by Dodwell Marketing Consultants 
to determine each firm's keiretsu affiliation. We focus on the bank-oriented keiretsu and consider 
firms to be belonging to a keiretsu if they are a member of any one of the following groups: 
Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, DKB, Fuyo, or Sanwa. According to this classification, 40% of 
our sample firms belong to a keiretsu. 
III. Empirical results 
A. Abnormal returns 
Abnormal returns are computed in the following way. We first group TSE securities into 
ten control portfolios ranked according to their Scholes and Williams (1977) beta estimates 
computed with respect to the PACAP equally-weighted portfolio for Japan. Then, we assign each 
acquiring firm to the control portfolio that corresponds to the beta decile of the acquiring firm. We 
compute the abnormal return on a particular day by taking the difference between the return on the 
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acquiring firm's shares and the return on the equally-weighted control portfolio assigned to the 
firm. This daily abnormal return is compounded to get the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
from day t1 before the merger announcement date to day t2 after the merger announcement date. 
We use t-statistics to test the hypothesis that the average CARs are equal to zero and sign-rank test 
statistics to test the hypothesis that the CARs are distributed symmetrically around zero. We obtain 
similar results when we use the market model method to estimate the abnormal returns. 
Table III reports the mean and median CARs for 104 Japanese acquiring firms around the 
announcement date (AD) and the effective date (ED) of mergers. The mean CAR (AD-1, AD) is 
1.41% and the mean CAR (AD-1, AD+1) is 1.19%, which are significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 
levels, respectively. The sign-rank test also indicates that the median CAR (AD-1, AD) is 
significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. Our results for Japanese bidder returns around 
the announcement date contrast with those for the U.S. bidders. Considerable evidence in the 
U.S. [Jensen and Ruback (1983)] suggests that bidder returns in friendly acquisitions are at best 
close to zero and sometimes significantly negative.10 Table III also shows that the CAR from one 
day after the announcement to one day before the merger effective date (AD+1, ED-1) is 
insignificantly negative. Further, the CAR for the two-day window surrounding the merger 
effective date (ED-1, ED) is insignificantly positive, which is consistent with evidence for the U.S. 
[Vijh (1994)]. Finally, table III indicates that both the mean and median CARs from sixty days 
before the announcement to twenty days after the effective date (AD-60, ED+20) are insignificantly 
negative. 
10
 One possible explanation for positive bidder returns in Japanese mergers is that many Japanese bidders may 
acquire targets at discount from their true values since most of targets in our sample are unlisted. To this effect, we 
compare the abnormal returns for bidders whose targets are listed with those for bidders whose targets are unlisted. 
Consistent with this view, we find that the mean and median returns are significant only for bidders whose targets are 
unlisted (the mean of 1.48% and the median of 0.52%). Unfortunately, the mean and median differences between the 
two sets of bidders are not significant. Alternatively, a positive bidder return may be largely due to the "bubble 
economy" in Japan during the second half of the 1980s. Our evidence, however, suggests that the stock-price 
reaction associated with merger announcements is significantly positive only for the mergers before 1986. Hence, 
the bubble economy explanation for the positive bidder return does not appear to hold for our sample. Finally, given 
that most of targets in our sample are small and unlisted, it is unlikely that positive bidder returns come from the 
creation of monopoly power. 
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B. Do managerial incentives matter? 
In this section, we examine whether the announcement effect documented in section III.A 
is associated with the potential differences in managerial objectives in Japanese mergers. 
Table IV provides the CARs (AD-1, AD) for various subsamples stratified by merger-
specific characteristics and past stock return performance for the sample of 104 acquiring firms. 
These classifications are intended to capture the potential differences in managerial incentives in 
mergers. Panel A of table IV separates firms into those involved in a related acquisition and those 
involved in an unrelated acquisition. The results in panel A show that when bidding firms pursue 
related acquisitions, the mean CAR is 2.28% and the median CAR is 0.74%. These are significant 
at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. On the other hand, in an unrelated acquisitionin, the 
mean and median bidder CARs are only 0.36% and 0.00%, respectively, both of which are not 
statistically significant at the conventional levels. The mean difference between these two 
subsamples is a statistically significant 1.92% with a t-statistic of 1.90. 
Panel B of table IV reports the results for subsamples based on the bidder's past industry-
adjusted stock return performance. We find that bidders whose stock price performance has been 
above average relative to their industries realize a positive mean CAR of 2.07% (t=2.67). In 
comparison, for the subsample where bidders underperform their industries, the average CAR is 
0.43%, and statistically insignificant. The mean return difference of 1.64% is again significant at 
the 0.10 level. 
Taken together, these results are generally consistent with those of Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1990), who perform a similar analysis for a sample of 326 U.S. mergers, and support the 
view that managerial incentives affect a firm's investment decisions, and therefore firm value. The 
results in panel B also suggest that a potential source of takeover gains depends, at least partly, on 
the quality of the bidding firm's management and its ability to reallocate target resources in an 
efficient way. 
In panels C and D of table IV, we report the CARs, stratified according to the median 
relative size of the target and the bidder. As a measure of relative size, we use the ratio of the book 
12 
value of target equity to the book value of bidder equity in panel C, and the ratio of the value of the 
transaction to the market value of bidder equity in panel D. If the bidding manager's major 
incentive for acquisition is to realize synergy effect by increasing economies of scale, then a larger 
size target, which is more likely to produce such an effect, will be associated with a higher return 
to the bidder.11 Alternatively, if a larger target implies the bidding managers' desire to expand 
their firm beyond the optimal size to increase resources under their control [Jensen (1986)], then a 
negative relation between the size of the target and the return to the bidder will result. For the 
subsample where the relative size measured by the book value is greater than the sample median 
(panel C), the average bidder CAR is 2.14%, which is significant at the 0.05 level. In 
comparison, for the subsample where the relative size measured by the book value is smaller than 
the sample median, the average bidder CAR is 0.67% and not significant. This pattern is more 
pronounced when the value of the transaction is used as a measure of the target's relative size 
(panel D). The average bidder CAR in the subsample above the sample median is 2.51% with a t-
statistic of 2.79 and that in the subsample below the sample median is 0.32% with a t-statistic of 
0.62. The mean difference of 2.19% is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
The results in table IV suggest that the relatedness of acquisitions and the past stock return 
performance of the bidder play an important role in explaining the return realized by shareholders 
of Japanese bidders. To further examine the relation between managerial objectives and bidder 
returns, we split the sample into four groups according to the relatedness of acquisitions and the 
past stock return performance of the bidder: Related/bad performance, related/good performance, 
unrelated/bad performance, and unrelated/good performance. Results in table V show that 
shareholders of bidders characterized by the "related/good performance" mergers realize the largest 
positive return. The mean and median CAR are 3.50% and 1.67%, respectively, and both of them 
are statistically significant. On the other hand, shareholders of bidders in other types of mergers 
11
 Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) hypothesize that if the bidding firm's value is affected by a merger, the 
observed abnormal return should be related to the relative size of the bidding and target firms. They indeed find that 
the bidder's abnormal return is positively related to the relative size of the merger partners. 
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earn statistically insignificant returns. For example, shareholders of bidders in the "unrelated/bad 
performance" mergers realize the smallest mean return of 0.02% with a median of 0.00%. 
Furthermore, the differences in mean returns between the "related/good performance" group and 
each of the other three groups are all statistically significant at the conventional levels. This 
provides further evidence that significant positive abnormal returns for Japanese bidders are limited 
to a specific subset of the sample and that the Japanese stock market reacts favorably only to 
mergers where managerial incentives are most closely aligned with shareholder interests. 
C. Bidder returns and Japanese corporate governance mechanisms 
The literature on the market for corporate control also suggests that bidder returns are 
related to firm-specific governance characteristics which serve as mechanisms to control managerial 
discretion. According to Jensen (1986), managers endowed with free cash flow tend to invest it in 
negative-NPV projects rather than pay it out to shareholders, and large debt creation helps limit the 
waste of the free cash flow and controls managerial discretion. This suggests that Japanese 
bidders who maintain high leverage are less likely to undertake value-decreasing acquisitions, and 
thus the stock market reaction to merger announcements is more likely to be positive for highly 
levered bidders. Fama (1990) also argues that bank loans provide a mechanism for monitoring the 
conflict between debtholders and shareholders and reduce managerial discretion. To evaluate the 
role of these capital structure variables in Japanese mergers, we further divide the sample into two 
subgroups according to the median leverage ratio (total debt / market value of the firm) and the 
median loan ratio (loans from financial institutions / market value of the firm). 
The evidence in panel A of table VI indicates that Japanese bidders with leverage ratios 
above the sample median experience positive mean and median CARs of 1.75% and 0.83%, 
respectively, both of which are significant at the 0.01 levels, while those with leverage ratios 
below the sample median realize insignificant mean and median CARs of 1.07% and -0.18%, 
respectively. The return differences, however, lack statistical significance. Results are much 
more striking when loans are used for classification. Results in panel B show that firms with loan 
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ratios above the sample median have an average two-day abnormal return associated with the 
announcement of mergers of 2.74%, which is significantly larger than the abnormal return of 
0.07% for firms with loan ratios below the sample median (at the 0.01 level). These results 
support both Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis and Fama's (1990) monitoring 
hypothesis, and suggest that debt, loans in particular, plays an important governance role in 
controlling Japanese managerial discretion. The results are also consistent with those of Kang 
(1993), who finds that returns to Japanese bidders acquiring U.S firms are positively related to the 
bidder's leverage and the bidder's ties to financial institutions through borrowings, and those of 
Kang and Stulz (1996), who show that the announcement return of equity issues in Japan increase 
with the loan component of a firm's capital structure. 
The concentrated equity ownership by large shareholders can provide strong incentives for 
them to monitor the performance of management and to reduce managerial discretion [Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) and Jensen (1989)]. To investigate the role of blockholders in Japan and their 
effects on firm value, we again bifurcate our sample by equity ownership held by the ten largest 
shareholders. Consistent with the monitoring role of large shareholders, panel C of table VI 
shows that only firms with equity ownership by the top ten shareholders above the sample median 
have a significant average return of 1.48% (t=2.19). The difference in mean returns between the 
two groups of firms, however, is not significant. 
In panel D, we divide our sample into firms that belong to keiretsu and those that do not. If 
the management of keiretsu firms behaves differently and pursues different goals from the 
management of non-keiretsu firms, we expect the announcement returns to be different between the 
two groups. The evidence in panel D indicates that while mean returns are significant for both 
groups, median returns are significant only for keiretsu firms. 
If managers in keiretsu firms are concerned about other keiretsu members and acquire 
targets to maximize the aggregate value of the whole keiretsu network [Kester (1991)], then 
unrelated diversification pursued by managers in keiretsu firms will have a different effect on firm 
value compared to unrelated diversification pursued by managers in non-keiretsu firms. To 
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examine this issue further, in table VII, we divide our sample into four groups: Related 
acquisitions by keiretsu firms, unrelated acquisitions by keiretsu firms, related acquisitions by non-
keiretsu firms, and unrelated acquisitions by non-keiretsu firms. The most important finding of 
table VII is that for keiretsu firms, unrelated acquisitions lead to a significant positive two-day 
announcement return. The mean CAR for unrelated acquisitions by keiretsu firms is 1.90% and 
the median is 1.13%, which are significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. The 
corresponding mean and median returns for related acquisitions by keiretsu firms are 0.84% and 
-0.02%, respectively, and are not statistically significant. We find an opposite pattern for non-
keiretsu firms. The mean (median) CAR for unrelated acquisitions by non-keiretsu firms is 
an insignificant -1.12% (-0.69%), compared to a significant 2.99% (0.81%) for related 
acquisitions by non-keiretsu firms.12 Therefore, our results support Kester's (1991) argument that 
Japanese managers in group-affiliated firms have a strong incentive to maximize value among 
keiretsu member firms, and the stock market reacts positively when managers pursue this goal by 
acquiring firms in different industries.13 
D. Cross-sectional regression analysis 
For the cross-sectional analysis, we use the CAR (AD-1, AD) as the dependent variable. 
Table VIII reports regression estimates for our sample of 104 Japanese bidders. The first 
12
 In unreported tests, we estimate the keiretsu-industry effect in a regression of the CAR (AD-1, AD) on a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one for a related acquisition by keiretsu firms, a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one for an unrelated acquisition by keiretsu firms, a dummy variable that takes the value of one for a related 
acquisition by non-keiretsu firms, and target equity ownership held by bidders prior to the merger announcement. 
The regression results lead to similar conclusions: Returns for both unrelated acquisitions by keiretsu firms and 
related acquisitions by non-keiretsu firms are significantly higher than those for unrelated acquisitions by non-
keiretsu firms. 
1 3
 Since alternative Keiretsu classifications lead to very different lists of member firms [Saxonhouse (1993)], we 
also estimate our tests using a broader definition of keiretsu membership, which includes all types of keiretsu in 
Japan, and find that results are qualitatively the same as those reported in table VII. Specifically, the mean and 
median CARs for unrelated acquisitions by all types of keiretsu firms are 1.78% and 0.74%, respectively, both of 
which are significant at the 0.01 level, and those for related acquisitions by all types of keiretsu firms are 0.70% and 
-0.12%, respectively, and are not statistically significant. On the other hand, the mean and median CAR for 
unrelated acquisitions by non-keiretsu firms are -1.93% and -1.29%, respectively, both of which are significant at the 
0.10 level, and those for related acquisitions by non-keiretsu firms are 3.50% and 1.27%, respectively, both of which 
are significant at the 0.05 level. 
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regression includes only merger-specific characteristics and the past performance of the bidder as 
explanatory variables. These include the dummy variable for the relatedness of acquisition between 
the bidder and the target using 3-digit SIC codes, the past stock-return performance of the bidder, 
the ratio of the value of transaction to market value of bidder equity, and target equity ownership 
held by the bidder prior to the merger announcement.14 The results show that bidder returns are 
positively related to the past stock-return performance of the bidder (t=2.53) and to the relative size 
of the target to the bidder (t=1.85). These findings confirm our previous univariate test results and 
are consistent with the view that merger benefits to shareholders of bidding firms are related to the 
objective functions of bidding firms' managers. The dummy variable for the relatedness of 
acquisitions, however, is not statistically significant. Our result for the positive relation between 
the bidder return and the past stock-return performance of the bidder seems inconsistent with 
Roll's (1986) hubris hypothesis. This is because the managers who are more likely to be infected 
with hubris are those of firms that have performed well, and accordingly, the hubris hypothesis 
predicts that those managers are more likely to overpay for their targets. Our evidence, therefore, 
is difficult to square with the hubris hypothesis. 
In the second regression, we replace a dummy variable for the relatedness of acquisition 
and the variable for the bidder's past performance by a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
if the bidder acquires a target in the same industry and the previous bidder industry-adjusted stock 
return is positive. This dummy variable is intended to proxy for mergers where bidding managers' 
incentives are most closely aligned with those of shareholders. Regression (2) shows that related 
acquisitions by good managers lead to significantly higher returns than other types of mergers. All 
else being equal, the return from a related merger by good managers is 2.88% (t=2.54) higher than 
the return from other types of mergers. 
In regressions (3) and (4), we use only firm-specific governance characteristics as 
explanatory variables. These results indicate that both the leverage ratio and the loan ratio are 
Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) show that prior bidder ownership of target equity affects bidder returns. 
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statistically significant variables in explaining the cross-sectional variation in bidder returns. The 
other governance variables, however, including equity ownership held by the top ten shareholders, 
are not statistically significant. When we estimate the regression using all explanatory variables 
[regression (5)], our results remain the same. 
To gain further insight into the role of ownership structure in Japanese bidding firms, we 
replace blockownership held by the top ten shareholders in regression (5) by equity ownership 
held by corporate shareholders and equity ownership held by financial institutions, and add 
management equity ownership. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that increased management 
equity ownership can lead to a better alignment of shareholder and management interests. They 
argue that as management equity ownership increases, the manager's incentive to exploit outside 
shareholders decreases, and hence the manager is less likely to undertake actions that reduce 
shareholder wealth. This suggests that bidder returns are higher when management equity 
ownership is larger. The estimates are reported in regression (6). A negative and significant 
coefficient on equity ownership by corporate shareholders (t=-2.10) is inconsistent with the view 
that Japanese corporate shareholders play an important monitoring role as large shareholders.15 
One possible explanation for this negative relation between bidder returns and equity ownership by 
corporate shareholders is that concentrated equity ownership by large corporate shareholders 
allows them to receive private benefits that do not accrue to other shareholders, thereby decreasing 
firm value [Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993)]. It is 
also possible that, as argued by Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994), a high level of equity ownership 
by corporate shareholders insulates managers from external influences and therefore leaves them 
15 Firms in a keiretsu typically own substantial equity in other keiretsu member firms. This mutual share 
ownership implies that the effect of corporate ownership in a keiretsu may be different from that in a non-keiretsu. 
To examine the keiretsu-mutual ownership effect, we estimate regression (6) using an additional interaction variable, 
equity ownership by corporate shareholders times keiretsu dummy. For this specification, the regression coefficient 
on equity ownership by corporate shareholders is -0.0009 with a t-statistic of -2.37. On the other hand, the 
regression coefficient on the interaction variable is 0.0003 with a t-statistic of 0.81. Therefore, equity ownership by 
corporate shareholders matters for both keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms. 
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free of the discipline. Regression (6) also shows negative coefficients on equity ownership by 
financial institutions and managers, but they are not significant.16 
Stulz (1988), however, argues that firm value first increases and then decreases when 
management equity ownership increases. He suggests that when management equity ownership is 
small, managerial interests are more likely to be allied with shareholders'. However, when 
management equity ownership is large enough to give managers control, an increase in managerial 
ownership makes managers more entrenched. Therefore, his model implies that there is a 
nonmonotonic relation between returns to bidding firms and management equity ownership. 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995) show that there is a 
nonmonotonic relation between market valuation and management equity ownership. 
To investigate whether there exists a nonmonotonic effect of the management equity 
ownership on the market value of the bidder's equity, we run a piecewise linear regression with 
turning points of 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%, and report the result in regression (7) of table VIII. 
Results indicate that bidder returns increase significantly as management equity ownership 
increases from 15% to 20%. Management equity ownership for other turning points, however, is 
not statistically significant. 
As a further check, we perform one sensitivity test on our management ownership 
measure. Instead of using a piecewise linear regression with several turning points, we analyze a 
nonmonotonic relation between bidder return and management equity ownership, employing two 
independent variables, management equity ownership and management equity ownership squared. 
In this specification, the coefficient for management equity ownership is 0.0024 (p-value = 0.19) 
and the coefficient for management equity ownership squared is -0.0001 (p-value = 0.11). 
16 We reestimate regressions (1) through (6) using an additional dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
bidders use a combination of cash and common stock as the form of payment and zero if bidders use only common 
stock. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1987) and Travlos (1987) suggest that the proposed method of financing affects 
bidder returns. They argue that stock financing tends to release adverse information about the acquiring firms [Myers 
and Majluf (1984)] and find that bidder returns are negative in pure stock exchange cases. Our results show that the 
coefficients on this variable are statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
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Overall, these results indicate that in the cases of Japanese mergers, the effect of 
management equity ownership on bidder returns is not significant. One potential explanation for 
the lack of a significant relation between bidder returns and management equity ownership is that 
equity ownership by Japanese managers is considerably less than equity ownership by American 
managers.17 Accordingly, management equity ownership in Japan may not play an important role 
as an incentive control mechanism.18 
IV. Summary and conclusions 
We provide evidence that mergers in Japan result in significantly positive wealth gains to 
shareholders of bidding firms. Returns to shareholders of bidding firms are significantly higher 
when firms acquire targets operating in the same industry, when their managers performed well 
prior to the merger, and when their managers acquire relatively large targets. We also find that the 
cross-sectional variation in bidder returns is related to a bidding firm's capital structure, which 
serves as a mechanism to control management discretion: Returns to shareholders of bidding firms 
increase with the bidder's leverage ratio and the bidder's loan ratio. Our results are generally 
consistent with the view that managerial incentives affect a firm's investment decision and therefore 
firm value, and that these incentives are affected by the internal corporate governance mechanisms 
that control managerial discretion. Finally, our finding that returns for unrelated acquisitions by 
1 7
 For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) show that for a sample of Fortune 500 firms, the mean 
(median) equity ownership by directors on the board is 10.6% (3.4%) in 1980. McConnell and Servaes (1990) report 
that in 1976 and 1986 the mean (median) board ownership for a sample of more than 1000 firm listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange or American Stock Exchange is 11.8% (5.05%). The corresponding numbers for our Japanese 
sample firms are the mean of 4% and the median of 1%, respectively. 
18 While we do not report the results in table VIII, we estimate regression (7) separately for two subperiods: 1976-
1983 and 1984-1990. Jensen (1989), Kester (1991), and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1993) argue that the 
deregulation of the Japanese domestic bond market, the easy access to the global capital markets, and the large cash 
balance held by Japanese firms in recent years have allowed Japanese firms to reduce their reliance on bank debt and 
to become less dependent on their banks. Given this financial shift, it is possible that the monitoring role of 
Japanese banks has diminished over time and thus may be less active in the later period than in the earlier period. 
The regression result shows that the coefficient on the loan ratio is significantly positive only in the earlier period, 
supporting the view that the monitoring role of Japanese banks has weakened over time. The average CAR (AD-1, 
AD) for Japanese bidders in the 1976-1983 period is 2.00% with a t-statistic of 2.11 while the average CAR (AD-1, 
AD) in the 1984-1990 period is 0.94% with a t-statistic of 1.63. The CARs for the two subperiods, however, are 
not significantly different. 
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keiretsu firms are significantly positive supports the view that the stock market perceives unrelated 
acquisitions by keiretsu firms to be different from those by non-keiretsu firms. Overall, these 
results provide evidence on incentives faced by Japanese managers, the working of the Japanese 
market for corporate control, and the functioning of corporate control mechanisms in Japan. 
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Japanese merger activity, stratified by year and by bidder industry 
Table II 
Summary statistics for Japanese bidders 
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Table III 
Mean and median cumulative abnormal returns (%) for Japanese bidders around the announcement 
date (AD) and the effective date (ED) of mergers 
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Table IV 
Two-day cumulative abnormal returns (%) for Japanese bidders around the announcement date, 
stratified by merger-specific characteristics and the previous industry-adjusted stock return 
performance 
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(Table IV continued) 
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Table V 
Two-day cumulative abnormal returns (%) for Japanese bidders around the announcement date, 
stratified by the previous industry-adjusted stock return performance (-270 to -20 days before the 




Two-day cumulative abnormal returns (%) for Japanese bidders around the announcement date, stratified by firm-
specific and governance characteristics 
Table VII 
Two-day cumulative abnormal returns (%) for Japanese bidders around the announcement date, 
stratified by keiretsu membership and the industrial relatedness between the bidder and the targeta 
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Table VIII 
Regression estimates of two-day cumulative abnormal returns for Japanese bidders on explanatory variables 
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